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IN  HIS  INFLUENTIAL BOOK Managing  Brand  Equity, 
Aaker (1991)  starts by quoting Larry Light,  a  promi- 
nent advertising official. Light argued that 'The mar- 
keting battle will be a battle of brands, a competition 
for brand  dominance...  It will be more important  to 
own markets than to own factories. The only way to 
own markets is to own market dominant brands.'  (p. 
ix).  Light  apparently  referred  to  the  battle between 
manufacturers'  national  brands,  which  is  also  the 
main thrust  of Aaker's book. However, increasingly, 
in  many  industries  this  almost  exclusive  focus  on 
national  brands  is misplaced.  In many markets,  pri- 
vate labels or store brands have become a  dominant 
feature. Retailers often 'own' their local markets, and 
they do so by developing their own brands. An 'extre- 
me'  example  is  the  large  British  chain  Marks  and 
Spencer,  which  sells  all  products,  from  socks  and 
soaps to roast chicken and cashmere pullovers under 
its own St. Michael label. No brand is immune to the 
threat  of store brands,  as Coca Cola learned in Great 
Britain  where  Sainbury's  Cola,  launched  in  April 
1994 and priced 28% below Coca Cola, won 15%  of 
the British cola market in just 2 years. In other coun- 
tries  like  Canada,  Switzerland  and  France,  retailer 
brands already claim more than  20%  of the flavored 
soft-drink market. 
Store brands are becoming ever more important in 
the Western world. This is due to a set of interrelated 
tactors:  increased  concentration  in retailing  enables 
retail chains to develop their own brands, consumers 
attach  less  importance  to  established brand  names, 
and  consumers'  attitude  toward  store  brands  has 
become much more positive, partly because the qual- 
ity of store  brands  has  dramatically  improved  over 
the  last  10-15  years.  Moreover,  large  retail  chains 
have advertising budgets of tens of millions of dollars. 
For  example,  the  Dutch  supermarket  chain  Albert 
Heijn is one of the largest advertisers  in the Nether- 
lands.  Marks and Spencer,  Sainsbury, The Gap, Ikea 
and Victoria's Secret are just a few other examples of 
retail chains that have been able to build strong store 
equity. 
In spite of the emergence and growing importance 
of  store  brands,  most  conceptual  and  empirical 
research still focuses on national brands. In this arti- 
cle,  we  try  to  rectify  this  relative  neglect  of store 
brands in the strategic marketing  literature.  We ana- 
lyze  the  market  power  of  store  brands  vis-a-vis 
national brands in more detail and provide an oper- 
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Printed in Great Britain ational measure of store-brand power that can be used 
to  identify  strengths  and  weaknesses  in  the  store 
brand's market position (1) within a product category; 
and  (2)  across  a  portfolio  of product  categories  in 
which the store brand is used. We will focus on store 
brands  in the grocery-retailing industry, where pri- 
vate labels are especially prominent. 
We first provide a brief review of the relative market 
position  of  store  brands  in  various  countries  and 
product categories. Next we describe an approach to 
operationalize  the  market  power  of  store  brands, 
based  on  the  loyalty of its  customer base  and  the 
brand's  ability to attract switching consumers. This 
measure is derived from widely available household 
purchase data. Then we present a case study in which 
we use the proposed measure to analyze the power of 
the  store  brand  of  the  largest  Dutch  supermarket 
chain, Albert Heijn.  We  analyze the position  of its 
store brand ('AH Huismerk') in 19 product categories. 
Finally, we provide conclusions and strategic impli- 
cations for retailers and manufacturers. 
The Market Position of Store Brands 
A major factor in the emergence of store brands is the 
rapidly increasing concentration in the retail sector, 
particularly grocery retailing, that can be observed in 
many Western countries. In smaller European coun- 
tries, like Sweden or the Netherlands, the three largest 
chains  already account for more than  60%  of total 
grocery sales, while this percentage is  around 40% 
for larger European countries such as Great Britain, 
France  and  Germany.  Only  in  the  US,  Japan  and 
Southern Europe is  this  concentration below 20%. 
Note though that in many individual states of the US, 
the  level  of concentration is  comparable to  that  of 
individual EU countries (Heijbroek et al., 1995). 
This  increased  concentration  in  retailing  allows 
supermarket  chains  to  develop  their  own  brands. 
Figure I shows the market share of store brands in the 
grocery retailing industry across a number of indus- 
trialized countries. In Great Britain, the market share 
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(AGB/Europanel, 1992). Store brands also have a sub- 
stantial  market share in many other countries.  Only 
in Southern Europe are private labels still less impor- 
t ant. 
The  market  share  in  Europe  of private  labels  has 
increased  substantially  over  the  last  15  years.  For 
example,  private  label  shares  in  1980  (1992)  in 
France,  Great  Britain  and  Spain  were  11%  (17%), 
22% (37%), and 2% (8%). One reason for this growth 
in market share is that retail chains  are increasingly 
~.~xtending  the  range  of  products  sold  under  store 
brands from mass-consumption basic products (oils, 
jams,  pastry  products,  etc.)  to  more  sophisticated 
products (sauces, diet products, cosmetics, breakfast 
~:ereals, etc.). A manager at the French chain Carrefour 
put  it  as  follows:  'We  launched  our  first  Carrefour 
products on the basic markets... We are now attacking 
more sophisticated markets...  If we want to promote 
t he Carrefour label, and by this means add value to the 
Carrefour chain, we must attack new sectors, cutting- 
~;dge  markets,  the  strongly  marketed  sectors.' 
(AGB/Europanel,  1992, p. 190). 
Interestingly,  in the US, the private-label share in 
1992 is less than 1% higher than it was in 1971. Hoch 
(1996) argues that this striking difference may be due 
Io European  countries  having  smaller  national  mar- 
kets with fewer strong national  competitors and less 
~.conomies  of scale  in  production  and  marketing,  a 
higher level of retail concentration, and the devotion 
of more managerial attention to store brands. 
To the retailer, carrying a store brand in a particular 
product category means that it has to perform a num- 
ber of marketing  tasks  that  are  normally  performed 
I)~  the  manufacturer,  such  as  branding,  packaging, 
inventory, promotions and advertising. Nevertheless, 
private labels can be very profitable. Hoch and Banerji 
(] 993) report in this respect margin differences of 20 
lo  30%  in  the  US  market.  Grant  and  Schlesinger 
(1995) describe how a leading Canadian grocery chain 
~:ould increase its profitability by up to 55% if it could 
persuade its customers to substitute two store-brand 
i  t~ms for two national-brand items on every purchase 
occasion,  and  Le  Roch,  head  of the  French  super- 
market  chain  Intermarch6,  claims  that  'national 
brands  are  now  sold  with  nil  or  even  negative 
margins.  We must therefore limit their market share 
b~ putting forward our own labels.' (AGB/Europanel, 
1992, p. 187). 
Store  brands  also  strengthen  the  retailer's  nego- 
tiating  position vis-a-vis manufacturers.  As the suc- 
cess  of  store  bands  increases,  the  manufacturer's 
willingness  to negotiate price and other concessions 
increases.  Even  the  threat  of  private  label  intro- 
duction  in  a  category may induce  manufacturers  to 
make concessions. 
Private  labels  can  also  be  used  to  increase  store 
loyalty and to distinguish the chain from other chains. 
Private  labels  were  often introduced  as  'best-value' 
products,  but  increasingly,  retail  chains  have 
improved their quality in order to raise the image of 
the chain  and to encourage consumer loyalty to the 
chain rather than to national brands. As it was put by 
one  British  retail  manager:  'Customers'  loyalty is  a 
fundamental reason for having own labels. If you have 
a nucleus of products which customers see as having 
a quality image, there is an inevitable dynamic creat- 
ed.'  A  manager  of the French  chain  Paridoc  argued 
that  'Our private labels are an indispensable  part  of 
our  range  on  offer',  while  an  Euromarch~  manager 
stated that private labels is 'what consumers want; it 
makes  them  loyal  to  the  chain'  (AGB/Europanel, 
1992, p. 181,187). 
Customer loyalty to store brands is only possible if 
they have a favorable image. Research in the five larg- 
est EU countries indicates that this is indeed the case. 
Many consumers feel that store brands have about the 
same quality as national brands and inspire as much 
confidence,  while they are cheaper  (see Steenkamp, 
1997 for details). Quality is a major factor in consumer 
purchase  decisions,  and  as  store  brands  have  suc- 
ceeded in substantially narrowing the perceived qual- 
ity gap, a major reason to buy a higher-priced national 
brand has been eliminated. 
Obviously,  these  findings  do  not  bode  well  for 
national-brand  manufacturers,  which  have  tra- 
ditionally sold their product on the basis of high and 
constant quality that  one can trust.  Not only do the 
more  expensive national  brands  continue  to  appeal 
less to the more price-sensitive segments of the mar- 
ket (as they did in the past), they now appear also to 
lose one of their remaining  competitive advantages, 
i.e.  their  superior  perceived  quality.  These  devel- 
opments are reflected directly in the national brands' 
decreasing  market  shares  and  have  the  additional 
indirect  effect  that  they  further  erode  the  manu- 
facturers' negotiation power vis-a-vis the major retail 
chains. 
Consumers  may benefit from the growing  success 
of private-label brands in a number of ways: a wider 
variety of high-quality products is available to choose 
from, total expenditure for their shopping basket may 
be  lower,  and  for  consumers  who  have  developed 
store  loyalty,  the  existence  of a  store  label  with  a 
consistently high quality across a wide range of prod- 
uct  categories  can  considerably  facilitate  the  shop- 
ping experience. 
It is interesting to note, though, that the penetration 
of private labels varies not only across countries, but 
also across product categories. In the US, private lab- 
els account for only less than 5% of supermarket sales 
of health  and beauty aids,  as  opposed to  over 20% 
in the  refrigerated  foods section  (Hoch and  Banerji, 
1993).  In  Great  Britain,  the  market  share  of  store 
brands  is  less  than  10%  for  dog  and  cat  food, but 
above 50% in such categories as hard cheese, kitchen 
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vegetables. Private  labels  account  for about 40%  of 
total  sales  in  France  in  such  categories  as  toilet 
tissues, kitchen rolls and green peas versus less than 
10%  for beer,  heavy  duty  detergents  and  shampoo 
(AGB/Europanel, 1992). In the Netherlands, the three 
major  private-label  brands  capture  a  much  larger 
share  in the coffee, green-peas  and  apple-sauce  cat- 
egories (> 20%) than  in the margarine  and sanitary- 
towel markets (< 10%). Private labels face a tougher 
battle in categories where: 
1.  the quality difference vis-a-vis national brands  is 
larger (Hoch and Banerji, 1993); 
2.  the  level  of technical  sophistication  is  high  (as 
only a  few players,  which  typically are  national 
manufacturers  with  vested  interests,  have  the 
necessary expertise--see Corstjens and Corstjens, 
1995); 
3.  the level of innovativeness in the industry is high 
(as this limits the remaining number of 'niches' in 
product space; Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995); 
4.  the  extent  of  price  competition  between  the 
national brands in the category is high (Raju et al., 
1995); 
5.  there is a  greater emphasis  on advertising versus 
sales promotions (Steenkamp,  1997). 
Operationalizing the Power of Store 
Brands 
Intrinsic Loyalty versus Conquesting Power 
Given the significance of store brands for retailers and 
manufacturers  alike,  it becomes important  to have a 
managerially  meaningful  measure  of  store-brand 
power. Retailers can use it to assess the power of their 
own brand within a particular category vis-a-vis other 
(national and private label) brands, as well as across 
categories  to  identify  possible  weaknesses  in  their 
portfolio  of product  categories  in  which  they  offer 
their private label. Manufacturers  can use this infor- 
mation to plan competitive actions to thwart the grow- 
ing strength of store brands in the product categories 
in which they are active. Previous studies (e.g., Hoch 
and Banerji, 1993; Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995 and 
Raju et al., 1995) have mainly considered the number 
of private labels in a product category and the store 
brands'  market  share  as  relevant  performance 
measures.  A  large  market  share,  however,  can  be 
driven by two conceptually very different factors: the 
existing customers can be loyal to the brand,  or the 
brand can be successful in attracting consumers who 
are willing to switch brands. 
In this  article,  our point of departure  is that  each 
product-category  market  can  be  divided  into  two 
groups of consumers: those who are loyal to one brand 
and those who are not loyal to any brand in particular 
and consider each time with a flesh mind all brands 
for possible purchase ('switchers'). Although this is a 
somewhat simplified view of the market, it has proven 
to be remarkably robust and useful in strategic mar- 
keting analyses. 
More specifically, we operationalize  the power of 
store  brands  vis-a-vis  each  other  and  vis-a-vis 
national brands along two dimensions, i.e. the brands' 
'intrinsic  loyalty' and their 'conquesting power'. The 
intrinsic loyalty of a brand refers to its ability to keep 
its  current  customers.  A  critical  issue  for  the  con- 
tinued  success of any retailer  or manufacturer  is its 
capability to retain  its  current  customers  and  make 
them  loyal  to  its  brands.  Brand  loyalty  has  con- 
sistently been linked to profitability. Indeed, the costs 
of attracting  a new customer have been found to be 
much higher than the costs of retaining old ones, loyal 
customers are typically less price sensitive, and the 
presence of a  loyal customer base provides the firm 
with valuable time to respond to competitive actions. 
A  large number  of loyal customers is  a  competitive 
asset  for  a  brand,  and  a  major  determinant  of its 
power. 
The second component of a brand's  strength  is its 
conquesting  power.  Markets  always  exhibit  a  sub- 
stantial  amount  of dynamism.  Consumers  enter  or 
leave the market, brands are eliminated,  new brands 
are introduced, etc. Moreover, all markets have a pro- 
portion of consumers who are not loyal to any specific 
brand, but who can be considered switchers. Hence, 
the ability of a store brand to keep a large proportion 
of  its  current  customers  is  not  enough,  because 
inexorably,  this  basis  will  be  eroded.  For  the  sus- 
tained  health  and  growth  of store brands,  it  is  also 
necessary continuously to attract new customers. The 
conquesting power of a brand refers to the proportion 
of the market's non-loyal customers (i.e. that fraction 
of the market that  is not loyal to any of the current 
players)  that  one  is  able  to  attract  in  a  given  time 
period. The underlying hope is to eventually convert 
these non-loyals into loyal customers after they have 
had a number of satisfying brand experiences. 
The two components of brand power can be com- 
bined  in  a  2 × 2  Brand-Power Matrix,  yielding  four 
quadrants  (see Figure 2 and Figure 5 below): low or 
high intrinsic loyalty combined with low or high con- 
questing  power.  The  upper-right-hand  quadrant  is 
clearly the  most  attractive.  The  brand  commands  a 
high  degree of brand  loyalty among  its current  cus- 
tomers,  and  is  able to  attract  many  non-loyal  swit- 
chers  as  well.  A  store  brand  which  fails  into  this 
category is clearly very powerful, and we label those 
brands 'Giants'. The lower-left-hand quadrant are the 
'Misers', as they are neither strong on intrinsic loyalty 
nor on conquesting power. Thus, misers are relatively 
weak on both accounts. 'Fighters' combine low intrin- 
sic  loyalty  with  high  conquesting  power.  These 
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brands have to 'fight' for customers each time they are 
shopping, but are successful in doing so.  Still, they 
may have to  make frequent use of price reductions 
or other promotional techniques in their day-to-day 
business operations to make their brand appealing to 
the  group  of potential  switchers  (see  also  Lal  and 
Padmanabhan, 1995).  Indeed, their low score on the 
loyalty dimension suggests that a  large part of their 
customer base  will  not  'automatically'  re-purchase 
the brand, but rather will re-evaluate all options again 
on their next purchase occasion. Finally, in the lower- 
right quadrant are brands that combine high loyalty 
with low conquesting power. We label these brands 
'Artisans'  as  they have  a  loyal  following, but  will 
not attract large groups of new customers. They are 
relatively  static  like  the  artisans  or  guilds  in  the 
Middle Ages. 
Giants  obviously  occupy  the  most  attractive 
position,  while  Misers  take  the  least  attractive 
position.  Fighters  and  Artisans  are  located  in 
between. Which of the latter two is more attractive 
depends on the strategic goals of the company. If the 
goal is to create short-run market-share gains, Fighters 
may be more attractive. They capture a larger portion 
of the switching segment, and will hence often enjoy 
a larger market share with all its advantages. On the 
other  hand,  Artisans  command  a  higher  degree  of 
brand  loyalty.  Given  the  advantages  of  a  loyal 
following, Artisans may be more profitable in the long 
run. 
The Brand-Power Matrix  can be used  for several 
strategic  purposes.  First,  provided  the  focal  store 
brand is used in multiple categories, it can be used in 
an  absolute  sense  in  that  its  position  across  these 
different categories can be compared in order to un- 
cover strengths and weaknesses in the private label's 
total  offering  or  product  portfolio,  using  absolute 
cutoff  values  for  loyalty  and  conquesting  power. 
Second,  the  Brand-Power Matrix  can be  used  in  a 
relative sense in that the relative performance of the 
focal  store  brand  is  plotted  vis-a-vis  other  brands 
within the same category. 
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brand Power 
We use the model of Colombo and Morrison (1989) to 
measure the two components of store-brand power. 
This model is well established in the marketing litera- 
ture,  its  parameter estimates have clear managerial 
interpretations, it is robust, and the data requirements 
are few. The input to the model is a switching matrix 
whose elements (i,fl represent the proportion of con- 
sumers that bought brand i on one purchase occasion 
but  switched to brand j  on the next occasion.  The 
element  (i,fl  therefore  gives  the  conditional  prob- 
ability  that  brand j  is  purchased,  given that  i  was 
bought  the  previous  time.  A  simple  brand-loyalty 
measure would be to look at the diagonal elements of 
the  matrix,  which  give  the  repeat-purchase  prob- 
abilities. This measure, however, does not distinguish 
between  (1)  customers  who  repurchase  the  brand 
because they are intrinsically loyal to the brand; and 
(2) customers who just pick any brand and happen to 
select the same one on two  consecutive occasions. 
The  Colombo  and Morrison  model makes  this  dis- 
tinction, and results in two measures of the power of 
brand i: 
1.  the  fraction which repurchases  because  of their 
inherent loyalty to brand i (called ~i), and 
2.  the fraction of the uncommitted customers brand i 
is able to attract on any given purchase occasion 
(called ~i). 
We refer the reader to Appendix A  for a more tech- 
nical  discussion  on  the  operationalization  of both 
dimensions. 
Case Study: The Market Power of 
Albert Heijn's Store Brand 
We will use our procedure to analyze the power of 
Albert  Heijn's  store brand  ('AH  Huismerk').  Albert 
Heijn  is  the 'flagship'  of the Royal Ahold concern. 
In a recent Corporate Image Barometer study among 
Dutch  decision  makers,  Albert  Heijn/Royal  Ahold 
rated highest of all major Dutch companies (Adfor- 
matie, 1996). Royal Ahold also owns BiLo, Stop and 
Shop,  Edwards,  Giant,  Tops,  and Finast in the US, 
and a variety of supermarket chains in a number of 
other  countries.  It  plans  to  open  200-1000  super- 
market  outlets  in  the  Far  East  in  the  next  5  years 
(Perspekt, 1996). 
Albert Heijn is the largest grocery retail chain in 
the Netherlands with a market share in 1996 of 27.9% 
(Perspekt,  1996),  and is widely perceived to be the 
most innovative Dutch grocery retailer. It has pursued 
a conscious strategy of developing and promoting its 
own store brand in a  large number of product cate- 
gories. It also promotes its store brand in its print and 
television advertising. 
Data Description 
Panel data describing the purchase histories in 1994 
of approximately 4000  Dutch households in  19 dif- 
ferent product categories were provided by GfK Food- 
scan,  which  is  part  of  the  pan-European  market- 
research  agency  GfK.  All  product  categories  were 
frequently-purchased grocery  products,  covering  a 
variety of food/beverage (e.g. margarine, beer),  per- 
sonal-hygiene (e.g. sanitary towels) and pet-food (e.g. 
dry cat food, canned cat food) products. In each prod- 
uct category, multiple brands were available, includ- 
ing Albert Heijn's (AH) store brand, other store brands 
as  well  as  national  brands.  For  each  category, the 
intrinsic loyalty (~i) and conquesting power (~i) of the 
three largest national brands and of the store brand 
for three major retail chains (AH, Edah, and C1000) 
were estimated, resulting in 114 ~ and 114 rc estimates. 
To explain potential differences in intrinsic loyalty 
and conquesting power across product categories, we 
obtained information on each category's level of mar- 
ket concentration, the average price discount at which 
the AH brand  is  sold,  the consumers' involvement 
with  the  product  category  and  their  quality  per- 
ception of the various brands  in each category (see 
Appendix B for definitions and measurement details). 
The presentation of the results is as follows. First, 
we compare the position of the AH store brand across 
all  19  product  categories in  an  absolute  sense  (i.e. 
regardless  of how  other brands  are  doing  in  these 
categories), and explore why AH does better in some 
categories than in others. Such an analysis is impor- 
tant as it provides an overview of the strength of AH 
in  absolute  terms.  After all,  regardless  of the  per- 
formance  of  its  competitors,  Albert  Heijn/Royal 
Ahold primarily derives its strength from its own mar- 
keting and financial performance (it does not really 
help if the competitor does lousy too, although it pro- 
vides  some consolation!).  Next,  we  shift  our  focus 
from an  absolute  to  a  relative setting by  explicitly 
considering the competitive environment. We com- 
pare the strength of the AH store brand on both intrin- 
sic loyalty and conquesting power to the position of 
leading national brands.  We examine the effects of 
some key variables that may drive the observed dif- 
ferences in loyalty and conquesting power between 
AH and these national brands, using the pooled data 
set (i.e., pooled across product categories). 
The Power of the AH Store Brand across 
Product Categories 
Figure 2 shows the power of the AH store brand for 
19 different product categories. The four quadrants of 
the  brand-power  matrix  were  created  using  the 
median ~i and ~i across all brands  and product cat- 
egories, and therefore reflect the actual competitive 
performance of the  AH  brand  and  its  competitors 
across a large number of different product categories. 
Intrinsic loyalty of 73% or higher is regarded as high, 
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low.  Conquesting  power  of 7.8%  is  used  as  cutoff 
point to differentiate between the high and low cells. 
This  means that brands  that  attract less  than  7.8% 
of the total pool of switchers in the marketplace are 
regarded as low in conquesting power, while brands 
attracting 7.8% or more of the switchers are regarded 
as high in conquesting power. Note that conquesting 
power does not pertain  to the total market, but only 
to those consumers which are not loyal to any of the 
available brands in particular. For example, suppose 
a  brand has  a  conquesting power of 20%  in  a  par- 
ticular product category, in which 60%  of the con- 
sumers can be categorized as loyal to one brand while 
40% are switchers. This means that the brand is able 
to attract 20% of the switchers in this market, which 
in this case implies 8% of the total market. 
The  resulting  interpretation  of the  four  cells  is 
straightforward. For example, brands are categorized 
as 'misers' if less than 73 % of their current customers 
is intrinsically loyal to the brand, and if, on average, 
they can only attract a small percentage (i.e. less than 
7.8%)  of  those  customers  which  have  no  special 
attachment (or loyalty) to any of the incumbents. The 
location of the brands in Figure 2 is determined by 
the center of a  circle whose size  is  proportional  to 
AH's market share in the category in question. 
In  four  product  categories  (decaffeinated coffee, 
regular coffee, chocolate strands, and evaporated milk 
(coffee cream)), AH is in an enviable position as its 
own brand rates highly on both dimensions of brand 
power. Given these strengths, it is not surprising that 
on average, the market share of AH in total sales in 
these categories is 15.1%. 
The AH store brand is  a  Fighter in the following 
categories: green peas, apple sauce, cornflakes, orange 
juice, and potato chips. Due to its high conquesting 
power,  AH  enjoys  a  sizable  market  share  in  these 
categories, on average 13.1%.  The challenge for AH 
in these categories is to transform occasional buyers 
into loyals. High loyalty but low conquesting power 
is exhibited for low-fat margarine, regular beer, and 
pantyliners.  On average, market share is rather low 
(5.2%), but those consumers who buy the AH brand 
tend to be loyal. A major issue for these Artisans is to 
attract switchers. This will not be easy in these mar- 
kets  as  they are dominated by large multinationals 
(Unilever, Heineken, Procter and Gamble, Kimberly 
(;lark). The AH store brand is a Miser in the following 
categories: regular margarine, frying margarine, light 
beer,  sanitary towels,  muesli, canned cat food, and 
dry cat food. Few people  are loyal to  the AH store 
brand in these categories, and its conquesting power 
is  also low.  Given this  weak market power,  market 
share is on average a low 3.4%. 
The market shares of AH in the four quadrants sug- 
gests  that  conquesting power is  more important  in 
creating  market  share  than  intrinsic  loyalty.  The 
difference in  market share between high- and low- 
loyalty categories is on average 3.5%, while this dif- 
ference between high and low conquesting power is 
on average 10.1%. This observation is supported in a 
correlational analysis.  The market share  of the AH 
store brand  in  a  particular category correlated 0.95 
(p<0.001)  with its  conquesting power in that cate- 
gory, and 0.34 (p=0.077) with its brand loyalty.* 
Figure  2  reveals  that  in  the  portfolio  of product 
categories  studied,  the  AH  store  brand  has  some 
strong positions (especially in the first quadrant), but 
also quite some weak positions. Why does AH better 
in  some  categories  than  in  others  on  one  or  both 
dimensions? What distinguishes Giants from others? 
We will consider the role of perceived quality of the 
AH store brand, product-category involvement, mar- 
ket concentration, and price discount.  See Figure 3 
for the means for each quadrant. 
A  key  factor  accounting  for  differences  in  AH's 
brand  power  in  the  various  categories  is  the  con- 
sumers'  differing perceived quality of the AH store 
brand in these categories. As mentioned in the Appen- 
dix,  consumer quality perceptions  of the  AH  store 
brand (as well as of three leading national brands) in 
each  product  category were  measured  in  an  inde- 
pendent  sample  of consumers.  Consumers'  quality 
perceptions were correlated 0.73 (p < 0.001) with the 
conquesting power of the AH store brand in the vari- 
ous product categories. The mean quality perception 
of the AH store brand in categories in which it exhibits 
relatively high  conquesting  power  is  higher  (mean 
rating of 5.12) than in those categories where its con- 
questing power is relatively low (mean rating of 4.45). 
Perceived quality also distinguishes between high 
and low brand  loyalty, although to  a  much weaker 
extent. AH's intrinsic loyalty in a category was cor- 
related only 0.08 with the perceived quality of the AH 
store band in the category in question. The effect is 
very weak but in the direction that you might expect: 
higher  quality  leads  to  higher  brand  loyalty.  Per- 
ceived quality of the AH store brand  is  on average 
4.86 in categories in which it exhibits relatively high 
loyalty and 4.71 in categories where its brand loyalty 
is relatively low. 
In sum, AH tends to command both a higher loyalty, 
but especially a  higher conquesting power in those 
categories where its quality is perceived to be higher. 
The effect is especially strong for Giants. On average, 
consumers perceive AH's Giants to be of substantially 
higher quality (mean perceived quality rating of 5.31) 
than the AH brand in the other categories (mean rating 
of 4.62).  Illustrative  is  the  difference between  AH 
decaffeinated coffee (a  Giant)  and AH regular mar- 
garine (a Miser). The former has a perceived quality 
rating  of  5.59,  and  exhibits  high  intrinsic  loyalty 
*All p-values are one-sided. 
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Perceived  quality:  4.96 
Involvement:  4.42 
Price  discount:  12.8% 
Concentration  62.5% 
Perceived  quality:  5.31 
Involvement:  5.00 
Price discount:  11.7% 
Concentration  62.4% 
Misers  Artisans 
Perceived  quality:  4.53 
Involvement:  4.90 
Price discount:  23.1% 
Concentration  69.5% 
Perceived  quality:  4.27 
Involvement:  4.92 
Price  discount:  28.0% 
Concentration  64.2% 
(86.7%)  and high  conquesting power (19.2%) while 
the latter has a much lower quality rating of 4.26, and 
only modest loyalty (61.1%) and conquesting power 
(5.3%). 
The price-discount variable revealed an interesting, 
and at first sight counter-intuitive, relation with con- 
questing power (r= -  0.27, p=0.13). A higher price dis- 
count was associated with lower conquesting power. 
The  AH store brand  sold at  an  average  discount  of 
12.3% in the high conquesting-power categories, ver- 
sus  an  average  discount  of 24.6%  in  the  low-con- 
questing-power categories. The reason is that,  as we 
have  seen  above,  the  AH  brand  in  the  high-con- 
questing-power categories are of substantially higher 
perceived  quality.  High  perceived  quality  provides 
consumers  with  another  reason  to  buy  the  (store) 
brand  than  only  price,  and  is  an  effective barrier 
against  price competition  (Steenkamp,  1989).  Thus, 
perceived quality of the brand clearly emerges as a key 
driver for AH's store-brand power across categories. 
The relations with level of concentration  and con- 
sumer  involvement  were  less  clear  cut as  only one 
quadrant  differed from the others.  (Such a  situation 
is  not  adequately  captured  in  a  simple  correlation 
coefficient.)  The  level of concentration  was  highest 
for the Misers with an average concentration level of 
69.5%  versus  62.9%  for  the  other  three  categories 
combined. It is clearly more difficult to build a strong 
store  brand  in  categories  with  a  high  level  of con- 
centration,  which  is  in  line  with recent  findings  of 
Dhar  and  Hoch  (1996).  Finally,  consumer involve- 
ment with product categories in which AH has Figh- 
ters  is  lower  than  involvement  with  the  other 
categories:  in  the  former  group,  the  mean  level  of 
involvement was 4.42, which is lower than the com- 
bined  average  of 4.93  for  product  categories  in  the 
three other cells. Fighters are categorized by relatively 
low loyalty and  high  conquesting  power.  They are 
most likely to occur in markets where there are many 
switchers in the first place.  Product categories with 
many  switchers  are  typically  characterized  by low 
consumer involvement. 
The Market Power of AH vis-a-vis the Three 
Leading National Brands in the Category 
Hitherto, we considered the absolute  levels of Albert 
Heijn's loyalty and conquesting power in each cate- 
gory. Equally important  is to analyze Albert Heijn's 
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gory.  Such  an  additional  analysis  provides  an 
enhanced perspective on the power of the AH store 
brand in the marketplace. AH may be underutilizing 
its  possibilities,  leading  to  a  lower  relative  per- 
formance  on  either  or  both  dimensions  of  brand 
power,  or it may be  doing better than the national 
brands,  even  when  in  an  absolute  sense,  its  per- 
formance is  not fully satisfactory. We  first provide 
two  illustrative  examples,  pertaining to  green peas 
and frying margarine. Next, we formalize our analysis 
by considering all categories. We examine the effect 
of possible market- and consumer-related factors on 
differences in  relative performance of AH vis-a-vis 
the average of the top three national brands weighted 
by  their  respective  market  shares,  in  a  given 
category. 
The relative power of the AH store  brand:  two 
illustrative  examples.  Figure  4  (upper  panel) 
shows the position of the AH, Edah, and C1000 store 
brands as well as of three leading national green-peas 
brands, viz. Bonduelle, Hak, and Jonker Fris, in terms 
of their intrinsic loyalty and conquesting power. The 
areas of the circles are again assigned in proportion 
to the brand's market share in guilders in each specific 
category (as such, the absolute sizes  of the areas in 
Figure  4A  and  4B  are  not  directly  comparable). 
Although all three national brands as well as AH are 
Fighters, AH's market power is actually strong vis-a- 
vis the leading national brands. Its intrinsic loyalty is 
higher than the intrinsic loyalty of Bonduelle or Hak, 
while  its  conquesting power is  second  only to  the 
market leader, Bonduelle.  In line with these obser- 
vations,  AH  has  the  second  largest  market  share. 
(;1000  and  Edah  are  far  less  successful:  although 
brand loyalty is at about the same level as the other 
brands, their conquesting power and market share are 
lOW. 
Compare this situation to the brand power of AH 
vis-a-vis the other brands in the frying-margarine mar- 
ket (Figure 4, lower panel). The frying margarine mar- 
ket is  dominated by two heavily advertised Giants, 
Croma and Becel. Both are owned by Unilever, and 
together have captured nearly 80%  of the market. In 
this category, AH is a miser, while the other two store 
brands  fall in the artisan category. The third largest 
national brand, Sense, is owned by a relatively small 
company. It is a  Fighter brand which cannot match 
the advertising expenditure of the Unilever brands, 
and is to a large extent dependent on attracting swit- 
chers. In this, it is reasonably successful as it attracts 
12.3% of the switchers, but it is not nearly as effective 
as  Croma,  the oldest brand  in  this  category, which 
appeals to broad strata in Dutch society. 
The relative power of the AH store brand across 
19  categories.  The above analysis clearly illus- 
trates that the relative competitive position of AH vis- 
a-vis the other brands  differs substantially between 
categories. We will now extend this analysis to all 19 
product categories. To keep the analysis manageable, 
we  compare  the  relative  position  of  AH  on  both 
dimensions of  brand power with the average of the top 
three national brands  (weighted by their respective 
market shares) in a given category. Figure 5 presents 
the  results.  From  a  relative  point  of view,  Albert 
Heijn's portfolio has two giant performers, viz., green 
peas and chocolate strands.  For these two products, 
the AH  intrinsic  loyalty as  well  as  its  conquesting 
power is higher than those of the average of the lead- 
ing national brands.  In the panty liner, muesli, and 
canned  cat-food  categories,  AH  is  doing  relatively 
well on loyalty, but lags considerably behind the lead- 
ing national brands in its ability to attract switching 
consumers. In the remaining 14 categories, AH scores 
below  the  weighted  average  of  the  three  leading 
national brands on both dimensions of brand power, 
although the power gap is small for some categories, 
such as apple sauce. The gap in brand power between 
AH and the leading national brands is especially large 
for frying margarine, light beer, and cornflakes. Inter- 
estingly,  two  of these  three  product  categories  are 
dominated  by  a  large  multinational,  with  widely- 
recognized marketing capabilities (i.e. Unilever, Kel- 
logg's), while the light beer market is dominated by a 
brand  from a  smaller company, Bavaria,  which has 
virtually created this category. This represents a good 
example of an on-going first-mover advantage. 
What are key factors underlying the differences in 
relative position between AH and the leading national 
brands on loyalty and conquesting power? To exam- 
ine this issue, the difference between the brand loy- 
alty  of AH  and  the  weighted  average  of the  three 
leading national brands  (~AH--2Av~  Nat), as well as the 
difference between the conquesting power of AH and 
the weighted average of the  three  leading national 
brands (~AH  -  TCAvg.Nat),  was correlated with the relative 
quality of the AH brand vis-a-vis the three national 
brands,  market concentration, the price discount at 
which the AH brand is sold, and consumer involve- 
ment with the category. 
AH's relative perceived quality as compared with 
the three leading national brands was related to the 
difference in conquesting power (~ -  0.51, p < 0.01).* 
The relation with the loyalty gap was in the expected 
direction,  but  was  weak  and  not  approaching  sig- 
nificance (r=-0.11). Interestingly, AH's Giants exhi- 
bited a  distinct profile. Their 'quality discount' was 
*The weighted average of the quality ratings of the three leading 
national brands in the category in question was computed using 
market shares as weights. One minus the ratio of the perceived 
quality rating of the AH store brand and the weighted average of 
the three leading national brands represents our measure of rela- 
tive quality of the AH store brand. 
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on  average  only 8.9%  versus  17.1%  for the  Misers 
and Artisans combined. 
Another  key  factor  is  market  concentration.  The 
more  concentrated  the  markets  are,  and  hence  the 
more market power leading brands  possess,  the gre- 
ater the gap with AH, both on brand loyalty (r= -  0.48, 
p<0.05)  and  on  conquesting  power  (r=--0.76, 
p<0.01).  AH's  two relative Giants  are  in  categories 
















with low market concentration  (with a mean level of 
46.9%)  as  compared  with  an  average  market  con- 
centration for the other categories of 67.5%. 
Product-category  involvement  nor  price  discount 
exhibited a substantial correlation with either dimen- 
sion  of  relative  brand  power,  but  involvement 
revealed an interaction effect in that the profile of the 
Giants again exhibited a distinct profile. AH's giants 
were in relatively low-involvement categories, with a 
mean  involvement  level  of 4.42  versus  4.85  for the 
~ther categories. 
Comparing  the  relative  and  absolute  power of 
the AH store brand.  A  comparison  of Figure  2 
and  Figure  5  clearly  illustrates  how both  analyses 
(in  absolute  and  relative  terms)  should  be  studied 
together to better appreciate the performance  of AH 
on  the  loyalty  and  conquesting  dimension.  In  five 
product categories, AH is an absolute as well as rela- 
tive Miser: dry cat food, sanitary towels, regular mar- 
garine,  frying margarine,  and light beer. That is, AH 
scores low on loyalty as well as conquesting power, 
irrespective of the absolute/relative classification. AH 
is a true Giant for chocolate strands. In both an absol- 
ute and a relative sense, the AH store brand performs 
very well in its ability to retain its current consumers 
and to capture a high proportion of the market's swit- 
ching  consumers.  Finally,  it  is  an  Artisan  in  both 
senses for panty liners.  For the other 12 product cat- 
egories, the relative perspective sheds a different light 
on AH's brand power than the absolute perspective. 
The most interesting  cases are represented by decaf- 
feinated coffee, regular coffee, and evaporated milk. 
In  an  absolute  sense,  their  loyalty and  conquesting 
power is very high; they are true Giants. However, on 
both dimensions  of brand  power, they perform  less 
than  the  weighted  average  of  the  three  leading 
national brands. It is doubtful whether AH will actu- 
ally be able to do much better in these categories, as 
they are dominated by a single brand (Douwe Egberts 
for the  two  coffee categories  and  Friesche  Vlag  for 
evaporated  milk,  with  market  shares  of 54%,  54%, 
and  32%, respectively) which is heavily advertised, 
and which  is the  'flagship'  of the company in ques- 
tion. Hence, strong retaliatory action by these brands 
may be expected to any move by AH. 
Conclusions 
Our findings indicate that the power of a store brand, 
even for such a powerful retailer as Albert Heijn, var- 
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an  absolute  and  a  relative sense.  In  some product 
categories, AH does very well, whereas in other cat- 
egories it struggles on either the loyalty dimension, 
the conquesting-power dimension, or both.  Several 
implications  emerge from these  analyses,  both  for 
retailers and manufacturers. 
Implications for Retailers 
Quality  improvement  is  the  key  to  suc- 
cess.  Perceived quality emerged as a prime factor 
underlying AH's conquesting power. The higher the 
perceived quality of the AH store brand, both absolute 
and relative to  its  competitors, the greater its  con- 
questing  power.  Further,  AH's  conquesting  power 
was found to be strongly correlated with its market 
share. Hence, the implication that improving product 
quality is  a prime way to build market share.  This 
finding is especially interesting as the role of higher 
perceived  quality  in  attracting  switchers  has  tra- 
ditionally received less  attention  in  the  marketing 
literature; promotions are often seen as the primary 
instrument. Our findings indicate that the quality of 
store brands is a key to their success in the market- 
place. 
Avoid the price-cutting trap.  Recently, several 
retailers have shown a renewed interest in price com- 
petition as a primary tool to increase market share, 
and have started to introduce budget store brands at 
significantly reduced prices.  Interestingly, our  fin- 
dings indicated that the price-discount variable is not 
a major driving factor of market power. Vicious price 
competition between (budget) own-label brands and 
national brands may not benefit either party. 
Periodically  evaluate  the  private-label  port- 
folio.  Our analyses also suggest that retailers may 
want to reconsider whether they should introduce/ 
maintain a store brand in categories where, for a var- 
iety of reasons, they are not able to match or approach 
the quality of the national brands. Even a retailer like 
Albert Heijn was often not able to build a strong brand 
nor a large market share in categories where its quality 
perception was relatively low,  although sometimes 
the AH brand was sold at a steep discount. One exam- 
ple is regular margarine, with a perceived quality rat- 
ing of 4.26 (versus a weighted average of 5.47 for the 
three leading national brands),  a  price  discount of 
almost 30% and a market share of about 3%. 
Implications for National-brand 
Manufacturers 
The other side of the coin obviously deals with the 
question  what  manufacturers  can  do  against  this 
onslaught by  private-label  brands.  Three  potential 
strategies can be suggested. 
Differentiate  yourself  through  product-quality 
improvement and product innovation.  First, 
our findings indicate that the  single most effective 
strategy  may  well  be  continuous  product-quality 
improvement  and  product  innovation.  National 
brands should continuously innovate to keep the pri- 
vate labels at bay. National-brand manufacturers can 
be expected to have more insight into consumer  needs 
with respect to their specific product category (after 
all, a  supermarket chain has to spread its  attention 
across  numerous  categories),  and  be  more  knowl- 
edgeable about the manufacturing process and tech- 
nological changes.  This  provides a viable basis  for 
quality improvement and innovation. A case in point 
is the potato-chip market. At first sight, this may not 
be perceived to be a market with much innovation 
potential.  However, the market leader, Smiths, has 
introduced a number of quality improvements in the 
last  decade (e.g.  crispy chips,  extra quality ribbed 
chips, innovative new packaging), and its perceived 
quality rating is much higher than AH's (6.23 versus 
4.87).  Associated with this difference is a big gap in 
conquesting power (39.8%  versus 8.2%) and market 
share  (44.1%  versus  7.4%).  Few  store  brands  can 
afford  to  pay  for  the  research  and  development 
needed to develop really new or improved products, 
and this could therefore offer a strategic advantage to 
national brands. 
Invest  in  advertising,  not  price  wars.  Man- 
ufacturers should also invest more heavily in adver- 
tising.  Although  we  did  not  have  information on 
advertising  spending,  previous  research  indicates 
that it strengthens brand loyalty (e.g. Aaker, 1991). 
Advertising can be used to build brand associations 
and to convey the message that quality has improved. 
Evidence from various countries including Great Bri- 
tain  and  the  US  suggests  that  in  categories  char- 
acterized by heavy advertising spending, store brands 
are less likely to capture a high market share. Manu- 
facturers seem to get this message as the share of ad 
spending  as  a  share  of  total  market  spending 
increased in the US from a low of 53% in 1991 to 56% 
in 1995. 
Why  not  'Sleep  with  the  enemy?'.  Finally, 
manufacturers may decide to 'Sleep with the Enemy' 
(or at  least the Rival),  by trying to  profit  from the 
growing popularity of store brands and engaging in 
the production of private labels  for retailers.  More 
than 50%  of all US manufacturers of branded pack- 
aged consumer goods including companies like Dole, 
Borden, Kraft and Heinz engage in such private-label 
production. Other companies like Heineken, Gilette, 
Mars and Coca Cola have refused to do so.  Private- 
label production can increase total sales volume and 
helps  to  reduce  occasional  excess  production 
capacity. On the other hand, the profit margin is typi- 
The Increasing Power of Store Brands: Building Loyalty and Market Share cally  lower,  there  is  cannibalization  on  own-brand 
sales,  and  store-label  production  can  result  in 
additional  manufacturing  and  distribution  com- 
plexities  that  add  costs  rather  than  reduce  them 
(Quelch and Harding,  1996).  This complex interface 
between cooperation and competition will determine 
to a large extent the long-run profitabilty, and perhaps 
even the very survival, of many national brands. 
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Appendix: The Colombo and 
Morrison model 
The key underlying assumption of the Colombo and Mor- 
rison (1989) model is that there are two kinds of consumers: 
•  people who are intrinsically loyal, and stay with the same 
brand, and 
•  potential  switchers,  who  on  every  purchase  occasion 
choose  between  all  brands  according  to  a  zero-order 
process. 
All potential switchers are assumed to have the same prob- 
ability to  buy a  specific brand,  but  this  probability  may 
differ across brands. The proportion of loyal buyers and the 
potential switchers' choice probabilities  are linked to the 
elements of the observed switching matrix through: 
Pii=0~i+(1  -- 0(i)/~i, 
pq=(1-~i)nj  i#j  (1) 
where p~j is an element of the switching matrix, ni the pro- 
portion of potential  switchers  buying brand  i,  and  a~  the 
proportion of the current buyers of brand i who is intrin- 
sically loyal. The first equation states that the (conditional) 
probability to repurchase brand i depends on (1) the pro- 
portion of loyals (~i); and (2) the proportion (n~) of the poten- 
tial switchers [(1-ai)] who decided to re-purchase brand i 
after all.  The second equation shows how the conditional 
probability Pij  equals  the  proportion  (nj) of the  potential 
switchers  [(1-~i)]  which  chooses brand j.  Clearly,  every 
actual switcher is a potential switcher, but not every repeat 
purchase comes from a  loyal customer.  ~  and ni are esti- 
mated for each store brand or national brand that is included 
in the  switching matrix.  Note that although ~  and ni can 
both vary between 0 and  100,  there is no simple relation 
between the two because they refer to a different base. The 
former refers to the proportion of the current buyers of a 
particular brand that is intrinsically loyal, while the latter 
reters to the proportion of the total number of switchers in 
the market that will buy your brand.  ~i will in general be 
larger than  ~i,  but this  has  no intrinsic  meaning  as  they 
refer to different bases. We refer the interested reader to the 
original  Colombo and  Morrison  article  for mathematical 
details.  In terms of our two dimensions of store brand i's 
power, it is clear that ~i measures its intrinsic loyalty, while 
~  is a measure of the brand's conquesting power. 
We added an 'others' category to the switching matrix to 
accomodate purchases  of smaller brands  to  avoid biased 
parameter  estimates.  Moreover,  when  customers  in  our 
sample made multiple purchases in the same category on 
the same day, it was impossible to empirically determine 
the purchase order. In those instances, we placed the pur- 
chases in a random order. 
Measure Description 
Apart  from  the  intrinsic-loyalty  and  conquesting-power 
estimates,  the GfK panel data allowed us to also compute 
some additional market characteristics.  The level of con- 
centration was computed as the sum of the market share of 
the three largest brands. Information on prices at which the 
various brands  were bought was also available.  For each 
category, we determined the average purchase price of the 
AH store brand and the average price of the three leading 
national brands over the  considered one-year period, the 
latter weighted by their market shares. One minus the ratio 
of these two prices represents the average price discount at 
which the AH brand is sold. 
Two variables that might prove useful in explaining dif- 
ferences in brand power were not available in the GfK data, 
viz., consumer involvement with the product category, and 
the consumers' quality perceptions of the various brands in 
each category. To obtain a measure of these variables, we 
used a survey in which consumers were asked to rate their 
involvement with  up  to  seven  categories,  as  well  as  the 
quality perception of the AH brand and of the three leading 
national brands in each category. The consumer needed to 
be a user of the category in order to provide ratings. Order 
of categories and brands were randomized. The total sample 
consisted of 190 randomly-selected consumers living in a 
medium-sized town in the Netherlands. Data were collected 
in  personal  interviews  using  computer-aided  ques- 
tionnaires.  Product-category  involvement  was  measured 
with the following three 7-point bipolar items (Steenkamp 
and Wedel, 1991): not at all important/very important; does 
not matter to me/matters a lot to me; and does not interest 
me at all/interests  me a lot. The reliability of the involve- 
ment measure was a high 0.88. Consumers' judgment of the 
perceived quality of the brands were measured on two 7- 
point  scale  bipolar  items:  bad/good  quality  and  unat- 
tractive/attractive.  The  two-item  measure  of  perceived 
quality  was  highly reliable  (~=0.89).  For both  measures, 
direction of the poles was randomized to reduce yea-saying 
effects. Individual ratings concerning category involvement 
and  brand-quality  perceptions  were  averaged  over  the 
appropriate items to arrive at product-involvement and per- 
ceived-quality ratings. 
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